

and methodologically, for determining an approach to the SPD once its class character is determined. The KJO position is related to the appraisal of the SPD in both an objective and subjective fashion. So far as we know both factions in your split characterize the SPD as a bourgeois technocratic party (akin to the U.S. Democratic Party). We consider this not merely wrong but that without a correct position on this question there cannot be a viable strategy for proletarian revolution in Germany. Only the low level of the class struggle in post-war Germany inhibits a manifest recognition that the SPD is a reformist (i.e. both bourgeois and proletarian) party which must at some point be destroyed. If the revolutionists ignore it, the SPD will employ its historically-evolved authority among the workers to disrupt and defeat the next revolutionary onslaught. The SPD's destruction must be sought at the appropriate junctures through intervention to sharpen inner differentiation to resolve, i.e. split, it into its essential bourgeois and proletarian elements, the latter organized into or led by a Leninist party. Only then will the SPD have been reduced, if still existent, to an external obstacle to social revolution.

The attempt to identify the SPD as akin concretely to the U.S. Democrats is ludicrous: the Young Democrats consists overwhelmingly of lawyers and professional people, not apprentices, centrists, Maoists, etc.; the Democrats receive sometime electoral endorsement from the distinctly separate top bodies of the trade union movement, labor leaders are in no way cadres of the Democratic Party and are but one of numerous pressure groups upon the Democrats; it is therefore grotesque and inconceivable to try to visualize the Democratic Party with factory fractions running slates competing in shop steward elections. These are but a few empirical contrasts. Regarding the SPD, to put it most generally, only great historical events involving enormous mass participation can definitively transform mass organizations. The creation of the mass KPD out of the fusion with the Independents partly demolished the SPD but the incapacity of the KPD facing the rise of Nazism and the Stalinists' association with the victorious Russian army strengthened the role of the SPD within the German working class.

We recognize the Leninist-Trotskyist distinction between first determining the working class character of a political party and then settling the question of entry. Moreover, given the rigid bureaucratic structure of the SPD, lack of strong internal tendencies toward polarization, i.e., minimal current opportunity for intervention within it and the urgent other tasks of revolutionists, entry to assist in splitting the SPD does not appear to be justified as a current tactic. But at each point the Marxists must have a line toward the SPD. With the SPD in a governing coalition as at present, we should note that the SPD has suppressed its inner class-contradiction by limiting its working program to that acceptable to its purely bourgeois ally. Hence we should tell the German working class voter that the SPD merits no support however critical until it breaks from its coalitionist practice, i.e., can in government become itself responsible for its conduct. Should the SPD campaign as the British Labor Party does on its own (except of course when the bourgeoisie really needs it as in the National Government of 1931 and during World War II) then our advocacy of electoral support should be along

the lines of e.g. "Brandt Out! SPD to Power!"

The SPD question possesses a certain subjective significance for both Spartacus-KJO and -BL. The cadres of each are evidently very young, mainly student and essentially originated in the German New Left. The ability of comrades from such a milieu to come to grips with the realities of proletarian revolutionary struggle is an index of the decisiveness of their break from the swamp of petty-bourgeois anarchic, youth vanguardist and Third World fantasizing. Generally among groups springing from these origins the question of evaluating the class character of deformed workers states as well as "deformed" workers parties is a litmus test of their grasp of Trotskyism.

III.

Taking all of the above into account, tentatively it would appear that Spartacus-BL stands closer to us, but given the rapid political mobility of the youthful German revolutionary left this appearance even if true is not necessarily definitive. Further, it is not now clear to us that the differences between the two German organizations are more than quantitative from our standpoint. Therefore as an interim policy on our part we propose in a fraternal fashion to continue seeking verbal and written discussions with each group, fully protecting any confidences of one group from the other. We hope to continue publishing fundamental SL documents in German and offering them equally and generally for distribution in Germany.

Surely our policy, which we find forced upon us by your split, must be deemed highly unsatisfactory by each of your groups to the extent either is concerned with the views of the SL. However we see no alternative to it at present other than an abstentionist anti-international withdrawal from concern about the German movement or the Pablist organizational practices of surreptitious intrigue--quite in contradiction to our programmatic aspiration of struggling to rebuild the Fourth International, i.e. upon principled foundations.

To reiterate: Ours is an interim policy based upon either the unclarity in your split or present deficiencies in our understanding or both. We hope you will assist us with written materials, discussions with our representatives and if possible with your representatives here in the U.S. in order to overcome the ambiguity which we feel. Incidentally we have scheduled the Third National Conference of the SL over the Labor Day weekend of 2-4 Sept. 1972.

At such a point that developments in the German movement or our understanding of it leads to a qualitative differentiation between your groups in our eyes, our first act will be to openly and publicly declare our position and its political basis.

Fraternally,
For the Political Bureau, SL/US:

W. Moore (German representative, SL/US)

James Robertson (National Chairman,
SL/US)

copies to:

RCL (Britain), Samarakkody (Ceylon),
Long (SL/NZ), Sharpe (French representative, SL/US),
Central Committee, SL/US

TEMPORARY COMMISSION OF NB, 2 APRIL 1972

Boston Temporary Commission of National Bureau, on local youth-party relations. This meeting was authorized by the RCY Closed Session of the Plenum held in Boston.

Present: Robertson, Gordon, Cunningham (PB); Cantor, Seymour, Cramer, Schaefer (NB); Steve G., Bob L., George A. (Boston NC members); Crawford (Boston SL rep. to RCY); Foster (Boston local SL chairman)

Meeting convened 2:30 p.m.

(Secretary's notes from the end part of the meeting, the bulk of which was devoted to other topics. These are the very last motions, after which the meeting was adjourned.)

Motion: That an RCY-NC/SL comrade be encouraged to resign from the NC, and to recommend to the NB he not be on the slate for the NC at the next national conference, noting the question of communist morality.

for: Richard Cramer

against: Cunningham, Gordon, Bob L.,
Schaefer, George A., Cantor

abstaining: Steve G., George C.

not voting: Robertson (not present during
discussion)

Motion defeated

Motion: Should another incident of deceiving the party take place, the comrade be asked to resign from the NC.

for: Cantor, George A., Steve G., Schaefer,
Seymour, Foster, Bob L., Gordon, Crawford,
Cunningham

against: none

abstaining: Cramer

not voting: Robertson (not in discussion)

Motion passed

Statement by Robertson: The motion adopted is illogical. It provides a specific penalty for a possible future act of unknown gravity.

For full minutes see PB secretary's notes H. C. 3 June 1972

LETTER FROM CANTOR TO MOORE
7 APRIL 1972

New York
7 April 1972

[Germany]

Dear Bill [Moore]:

I am writing you mainly about a particular problem we have in the Boston RCY, i.e. [an RCY-NC/SL comrade]. First let me say that overall, however, we came out of the SDS intervention and RCY plenum feeling generally pleased and proud of ourselves--the intervention went off very well, a nice clean split with no violence. The plenum went off well, given tight scheduling in the midst of an SDS conference, did indicate pressing need for further discussion on a lot of points raised by the draft RCY document (which I enclose--it will be the basis for a much longer document for the national conference over Labor Day, also enclose SDS position paper and a press release we wrote up for the occasion).

On [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]--you were present at an initial discussion we had in NYC when we realized he had deceived the party, had not only failed to produce an important document for the national organization, but had then lied about it. At that point we decided to temporize and let George C. handle the matter, which he did through a series of long private discussions with [the RCY-NC/SL comrade], who admitted in the course of them that he had indeed failed to produce the document and had lied about it. Well, all right, we were encouraged that [the RCY-NC/SL comrade] was able to recognize and admit the reality of the situation to other comrades. Following the plenum, we had a meeting in Boston to discuss various Boston RCY difficulties, among them [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]. Attending were Jim & Liz, Mark, Libby, Richard and myself, Bob L., Steve G., and George A. from the Boston RCY, and George K. and George C., who is the party rep to the youth in Boston. At the meeting, the question of [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]'s functioning was raised in an extremely sharp manner, and a motion was put forward that he be asked to resign immediately from the organization, to function as a sympathizer. This motion failed, and the following motion was proposed and passed: "That should an incident of deceiving the party occur again, the comrade be asked to resign from the NC."

I'm writing you because of your past relationship with [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]--you essentially recruited him, are familiar with his problems, and have worked with him, and I hope you can offer some suggestions or opinions on this matter. Jim [Robertson] thought also it would perhaps be useful to write you. The problem we have now is how to assimilate and integrate him into the communist movement. I'm afraid we are dealing with an individual with a good deal of talent and potential, but now crippled by severe psychological problems. Most comrades, myself included, do not feel too optimistic about how he will work out in the communist movement because of these severe problems, but we want to temporize at least for the next immediate period and attempt to help him in functioning in the communist movement.

The Boston RCY leadership, particularly Steve G. and Bob L. are

Letter from Cantor to Moore, 7 April 1972 2.

also very concerned over this problem. They had proposed him as one of the members of a 7-man local exec. slate, and the membership voted him down. He is not respected in the Boston local, and that's too bad, as he is probably the most politically developed of the RCYers there. On the other hand, comrades' reluctance to elect him to a post of leadership is understandable given his severe [foul-up] in the recent period, let alone his other problems, that is, his conceit and arrogance combined with a certain shying away from attempting to integrate himself into the functioning of the local, and his own insecurities. As John [Sharpe] noted in a letter to Jim "...about [the RCY-NC/SL comrade], although I don't know him as well and don't really have any ideas, except that he has a bad case of self-hatred and urges to self-destruction."

As I said, I'm not too optimistic about his future in the communist movement, but I would very much appreciate any contributions you can make to help us in this situation. One of the difficulties involved is that [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]'s problem is not merely inability to function, but also involves attempts to deceive the party on this point, which is certainly a breach of communist morality, and a very serious thing. I am willing to temporize for a certain time because I feel this action was compulsive, stemming from severe psychological problems (most cdes. feel the same way, I think)--but in the long run, of course, the party cannot tolerate that kind of behavior. We are willing to attempt to save him as he does represent a potentially (and has proven, in practice already to some extent, his worth) valuable comrade.

Well, let us know at least what you think about this. Have a meeting in 5 minutes, so can't write at length. Hope to devote the bulk of my time remaining in the U.S. to minutes production.

Comradely,

Helen [Cantor]

cc: SLNO, George C. (Boston)

LETTER FROM STUART/MOORE
TO BOSTON, 10 APRIL 1972

[Boston]

Bonn, 10 April 1972

George C.
Steve G.
John S.
files

Dear Comrades,

A letter from Helen which arrived today (copy enclosed) left both Bill and me not only confused, i.e., in need of information, but also distressed and disturbed. The questions we both have will be evident in the following.

Initially, I do not understand why this matter was raised in the meeting following the plenum at all, much less in "an extremely sharp manner". On the simple assumption that [an RCY-NC/SL comrade] does not act as he did out of any type of organizational malice, it seems to me that at this time raising the point organizationally can only lead to a further deterioration of the situation; whiplashing [the RCY-NC/SL comrade] is not going to solve the problem, but will rather worsen it until he is driven out of the movement to find no useful end anywhere else. I do not believe in the coddling of comrades, revolutionary cadre must be able to function as responsible human beings, but I do not believe that the manifestation of apparently severe anxiety on the part of a young comrade should initially be dealt with with the proverbial heavy hand. Obviously one interpretation is that someone at the meeting lost their temper, but cooler heads prevailed--leaving aside for the moment the question of why it was brought up at a meeting in the first place. That would be a very comforting interpretation, but seems to be rather untenable, considering the motions involved. It does appear that other measures were open, namely George C.'s long series of private discussions with [the RCY-NC/SL comrade], which seem to have met with at least limited success, i.e., [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]'s admitting of the reality of the situation which he had previously denied. But the emphasis seems to have shifted considerably from, while making sure that organizational functioning was not jeopardized through the placing of large amounts of responsibility on [the RCY-NC/SL comrade], at the same time primarily working as much as possible or feasible to help [the RCY-NC/SL comrade] in the solution to the problems paralyzing his political development to, at all costs, protecting the organization. One is led to ask from what. No organization which understands the limits of its cadre even implicitly would be in jeopardy from failing to organizationally crush one of the weaker ones. I find it difficult to understand the last paragraph of Helen's letter (first page): what discussion could have possibly led to the adjectives of conceit and arrogance being applied to [the RCY-NC/SL comrade], and what in the world

Letter from Stuart/Moore to Boston, 10 April 1972 2.

is meant by "shying away from attempting to integrate himself into the functioning of the local". Along with my own deep-seated suspicion of ersatz psychological analysis carried on by people with no training, I feel compelled to point out that we are not running a friendly circle of congenial people, and in no sense can [the RCY-NC/SL comrade]'s inability (at present) to carry out a heavy load of responsibility be construed as unwillingness.

Now to the motions: passing over the obvious absurdity of the motion that he be asked to resign immediately, I have a criticism of the motion that was eventually passed. (That such a motion was passed is why the comforting interpretation mentioned on the last page is obviously not tenable.) Obviously, if the comrades feel the situation warrants resignation from the NC, it should be asked for, or if such a situation happens again, such a request could come up on the agenda. But the methodology of an "if . . . then . . ." motion, placing the entire burden of proof that he is not deceiving the party at every turn on [the RCY-NC/SL comrade] is certainly questionable. Either his act warrants requesting his resignation or it doesn't at the time. Such a motion has, in my opinion, about the same political effect as the pre-signed confessions used in Stalinist circles. To expect a comrade to operate under the sword of Damocles is a bit much.

In short, it appears to me that unless since I last saw him [the RCY-NC/SL comrade] has gone completely off the rails, this problem could have been worked out in cooperation with him and in a comradely fashion, rather than posing him as a threat to the organization, which is the thrust of Helen's letter. If people are serious about saving [the RCY-NC/SL comrade], or attempting to, then my main comment is that at best the attempt was rather ham-handed, it will not serve that function, and is the clearest way to drive anyone who is not made of tempered steel (undoubtedly the goal for cadre composition, but let us be realistic) out of any organization. It should be possible to function under freely admitting that in the carrying out of certain types of responsibility [the RCY-NC/SL comrade] is not the ideal choice until he solves his personal problems, while still recognizing his obvious talents and desire to be a revolutionary. Especially as Bill has been asked for advice (considering the situation as Helen described it, I cannot help asking for what, the type of burial service to be performed?), he needs, and I would like, some idea of what events occurred in what sequence and the outcome since then.

Comradely,

Stuart

P.S. I find Judy's remarks extremely pertinent. Before I can give

Letter from Stuart/Moore to Boston, 10 April 1972 3.

any sort of 'advice', I need to know more about the situation. By the way, Judy, Libby, John, and I spent about 2 hours in Paris talking about this situation, without much in the way of conclusions. In addition to Judy's remarks, I would like to know the following: a) was the preliminary, informal attempt successful in bringing George around? i.e., was there any evidence of an imminent repetition of the incident? b) How did this discussion get on the agenda of the meeting? c) Who introduced the various motions, and what was the breakdown of opinion, especially, what role did the SL leadership play?

Comradely,

[Moore]

STATEMENT OF THE SPARTACIST LEAGUE AND
 REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST YOUTH TO THE MEETING
 WITH THE FAGEN-JOHNSON GROUP IN LOS ANGELES
 ON 20 MAY 1972

[This statement--drafted by comrade Carter, corrected by Robertson during phone consultation and presented orally by Carter--served to break with a proposed continuation of the temporary bloc with Johnson-Fagen and to consolidate our sympathizers around us as against J-F.

--N.O. 28 June 72]

The Spartacist League and the Revolutionary Communist Youth are for revolutionary regroupment and class solidarity. This means we seek united fronts for these ends, i.e., common actions by working class tendencies around needs of the working class with full freedom of propaganda and criticism on the part of all the participants in order to expose the class traitors and to present a common front to the class enemy.

Objections to making this body a united front on the grounds that a mass reformist party like the C.P. would co-opt it show a fundamental mis-orientation. Firstly, if this body could get the C.P. to act around the demands of "30 for 40", "labor strikes against the war and the wage freeze", or for a "labor party", we will have gone a long ways in bringing class consciousness to the working class. Secondly, excluding or suppressing a tendency that agrees to the basis for the united front, while sectarian in form, is almost invariably opportunist in content. If this group begins to exclude working class tendencies on the basis of their past history, their program, or any other point outside of their declared willingness to act upon the commonly agreed upon slogans and actions, then it is defining and circumscribing its membership as a political tendency. Its first task then is to explain the reason why it stands as an alternative grouping to the C.P., S.W.P., S.L., and every other contender for the leadership of the working class.

It should be remembered that six months ago, [the Fagens] and others attempted unsuccessfully to form "a study group in transition to an organization"--in essence, an organization which would not have to justify the very serious political decision of independant organizational existence. They pulled together some people, most of whom considered themselves Trotskyists, none of whom had any open criticism of the S.L., on what was supposed to be an agnostic basis as far as program was concerned. It was then attempted to exclude all participation of the S.L. in the group's projected course of studying all the programs on the left, electing officers, and going into trade unions in order to test the program adopted in the future. It

Statement by L.A. SL/RCY, 20 May 1972 2.

was evasion of coming to grips with the program of the S.L. and an attempt to form a power bloc against it. It was for such reasons that Joe J. [Johnson] was against it at the time.

If this body does not set itself on the basis of the united front, but rather goes ahead to attempt to create a basis for exclusion without a basis for existence, then the S.L. will take no responsibility for such maneuvering and will oppose such action.

Last Saturday night there was a bloc meeting with the S.L., Joe, the Fagens and others to push for two slogans and an action proposal to the student strike steering committee the next day at UCLA. The partners of this bloc began to go their own way when Joe gave only a half-hearted and partial presentation of the proposals of the bloc to the mass meeting Sunday and when the next day both Joe and Ted were calling for the seizure of Murphy Hall--an act which, in the context of a failing student strike, would only have opened up the participants to arrests and victimizations.

At this meeting the Spartacist League/Revolutionary Communist Youth propose the following:

A demonstration and rally calling upon the working class to strike against the war and the wage freeze, leafletting of important union halls and workplaces advertising the demonstration and rally and calling upon the workers and their unions to participate and to send speakers. All left and working class tendencies will be invited to participate on the basis of having their own leaflets, signs and slogans. Each organization and group that supports the essential of the demonstration will be asked to speak at the rally and to send a representative to the demonstration's steering committee.

Comrade Cunningham on the CC Slate Question

21 May 1972
Berkeley, California

PB --

Dear Comrades:

I am in the middle of writing a long analysis of the BA situation, which I want to use to motivate a series of suggestions and proposals. I still hope to get it there by the time of the upcoming expanded PB meeting this weekend. Nevertheless, since Jim R. called late last night, I feel called upon at least to take a position on the slate proposals for the incoming CC. What I'm interested in here primarily is the framework in which this becomes (or doesn't) an important question.

I'm really limited not so much by the facts but the tone of the whole ... situation, and the real possibility of a sizeable fusion. It may even be impossible for us to fit it in in a timely manner untrammelled by too much pressure from us due to the Labor Day date. If it's as good as it sounds, and still as hazy as it appears to be, then a question I voiced before may be important: that our Conference may well prove abortive in any case, and it might be well to put it off to the indefinite future, e.g., Christmas. If [a foreign group] were truly as convinced of our superiority in the U.S. left as ... appears to think, then what will have to become a central topic for our work will be the international question, since real indicators appear to be opening up vis-a-vis an International Conference of some type in the next year or so. This ought to be part of the Conference material, as the OCI, Germany and England all become real questions.

Taking all that into consideration, it still seems to me I should stay out here until the time I had originally intended to come back, immediately after the July 4th holiday traffic slows down and I can get an inexpensive flight out of L.A. It is a question of real priorities; the slate fight seems at best now a struggle of shades, while logic and reality dictate chaos and anarchy here. The situation is too good and too ripe to take chances. (Incidentally Tweet has to get back to LA immediately after the PB if not sooner, as that situation is as unstable as they come.) There is no real local leadership in the BA at present because, excepting the past few months, no collective leadership has been prepared. The local at the same time is becoming real--there were 22 people at the last meeting, and it should soon go over 25, all real or proto-members, with reinforcements equalling the number transferring out. I have no intention of making the same mistake I made in L.A. last month, falling into the trap of role ambiguity--the situation at present is a triumvirate leadership lashup of Sue A., Gene G. and myself, me playing a role by default of local political chairman. I need to overlap Al when he gets here at least long enough to tell him some horror stories and point out the storm warnings. I balanced that against coming back immediately.

While I understand the reference, the relevance of the present situation to Jim's comment about the '39-'40 faction fight being preceded by a slate fight seems overdrawn. If that's the mood there, that could easily turn into a clique battle. There's no evidence I've seen there are any serious political issues. All slate fights surely don't predicate factional issues. Even a more serious division on a secondary issue isn't necessarily prefactional; so far as I'm concerned, that's an integral and necessary part of collective leadership and the battling of shades. I don't want to be pollyanna-ish about this, but there aren't any differences yet. As for '39-'40 that's true, but the slate fight was in lieu of not fighting out earlier questions when they arose. If Cannon isn't exaggerating in The Struggle for a Proletarian Party the faction fight came late, and while a lot of skeletons got pulled out of closets then, a lot of festering sores were around. The lineup was hardly accidental: Burnham and Carter had publicly denied that Russia was any kind of workers state at least by early 1938; Abern was functioning in a scandalous fashion over and over again; there must have been a deep sourness regarding 'office bureaucratism' for years. With these kind of differences the oncoming war made a division inevitable, and the lines of demarcation were there a long time before they surfaced.

We are not faced with long festering wounds and a war around the corner. At the same time it is true that the upcoming CC and PB will be in all probability under a lot more pressure and stress than was true of any of them in the past, if internal events are any indicator. Our rapid growth necessarily means we're becoming heterogeneous. Fusing what we're getting into an integrated unit means by definition fights, consolidation, ruptures and the like; it would be unreal not to expect this to find expression in the higher bodies of the organization. Certainly stability is important but so is range. I don't see that tendencies can or should be avoided at the present time, and to the extent they exist they ought to be known as such. Winning them over in struggle will prove as important as fighting them when they emerge.

I find it hard to get to the point I want to make, without sounding platitudinous or do-goody. But with the names being kicked around now in consideration for full CC posts, I just cannot see huge differences and I think I know all the people involved well enough to say that. To be honest, I am a lot more worried about our ability to assimilate, direct, and prevent some kind of unconscious entry from the ... we're planning fusion with, especially if we get a lot of them.

I don't suppose that satisfies anyone, least of all myself, but the situation for me is so damned nebulous that I really find it hard to make a clear-cut case for any of the people under consideration; I don't see qualitative differences among the lot of them. That's what makes the question of the division among them so difficult for me to understand.

To get down to cases: Jim said my name was associated with a certain list of names who were supposed to be "my" slate. Allow me to make the possibly unwarranted assumption that Tweet's fine Italian hand is behind some of this, at least in slant. I am supposed to

want George Rep, Helene, Nick and Bill G. added to or continued as full CC members. This is just a little bit better than half right (which is to say about half wrong). Not only do I not see this as a counterposed slate: I don't think they all belong on.

Now, what gives this whole rumor the earmarks of Tweet is the first name: George Rep. Possible confusions in L.A. and New York notwithstanding, I never said nor do I think now that Rep at the present time belongs on the full CC, and despite the lobbying I got from Tweet especially I did not change my mind. Al and I spoke about Rep when I first got here, and I've not changed; further, I've spoken to both Rep and Helene on the question, so there cannot be any confusion there. I believe I recognize Rep's abilities as well as anyone in this organization, and respect him for them. But political knowledge and presumed theoretical range are far from the only basis for authority in the Leninist movement, although it is not inconceivable I rate these qualities higher than others might; such a conception denies the functional and military aspect of party work. George came into the SL at the time of the CWC fusion with a great deal of authority; he has managed by his wretched functioning to dissipate most of it, to such an extent that the "Rep problem" plays a prominent role in most BASL exec. meetings. To be sure, I'm not a believer in the school that says it's all his fault, given his history and obvious functioning; I think he could have been handled in a less cursory, more serious manner by Helene and the rest of the BA leadership: he was never aided in finding a role in the local, nor so far as I can tell, were any serious attempts made to integrate him, or break him from his unwordly, life style habits. I want to see a course of action set up to rehabilitate both him and his authority because of his considerable capacity; it isn't by accident that his letter to Wohlforth in From Maoism to Trotskyism was reprinted in whole in WV and is in a way a model of analytical-polemical writing. But to presume I want to keep Rep on the full CC as he is without a qualitative upgrading of his work would be to presume also that I see the SL as a kind of political analogue to the Italian army circa 1916.

I don't object to Tweet lobbying for George if she really thinks he belongs on the CC and is being left off for incorrect reasons. I do object to any implication I'm in agreement, or that she's voting my proxy.

The case of Bill G. is a horse of another color entirely. It's true what you've heard rumored, that I think he does belong on as a full CC, and I'd urge the PB to consider this recommendation seriously. As I recall, he was right as often as not in the political issues in Boston, a good deal of our cadres picked up in that area were initially contacted and encouraged by Bill. I don't know whether all that squabbling over the years in Boston has completely died away yet, but I hope so; in any case it was never my opinion it was altogether one-sided, or that this is any kind of criteria anyway.

It's hard to assess in two or three sentences our international work, or Bill's role in it, but it's my strong impression on the whole it's been positive and then some. How much of the negative

stuff was due to inexperience, how much poor judgment and how much a lack of guidance from the center is hard to say. I certainly don't want to imply that the errors he made did not have a Pabloist organizational component, or else I wouldn't have taken the attitude I did in the RB confrontation with him. But if you look at that incident in perspective I think it's clear this was of an episodic nature, not an ingrained one nor one typical of his work--certainly I don't think anyone could make a case he's a Pabloite or a left-centrist of some kind. So, despite the orientation of some of his functioning in Europe his errors seem entirely those of commission not omission, and I think he's worked damned hard. It seems obvious to me further that to the extent we get a breakthrough in Germany, it will be due predominantly to the work he's done there, and in general I think the course he's outlined has been politically correct, although organizationally somewhat inept and precipitous. His return last March to take the medicine doled out to him, which I at least anticipated, is an indication of his seriousness and commitment, and I think it's generally held that he's one of the most theoretically imaginative and creative people in the organization, with a remarkable range of knowledge and information.

So, adding Bill would I think strengthen the SL in its leadership, although this to me has a formal rather than burning (slate-fight type) character precisely because of his continuing absence from the American scene for the next year or two. What I would consider important in this regard, rather than a fight, is the consideration of a future for Bill in the center when he returns--an assignment as translator, writer, editor, or whatever--since it's in that area of work where he excels.

Finally, as for Nick and Helen, I couldn't do justice for this theme in less than a book, and I won't try. Basically, I consider them peers, along with in my estimation Reuben and Chris. All of them have defined and well-known strengths and weaknesses, and I can't see that one or several are qualitatively better--or worse--than any other. Reuben is not at question here, because of the youth automatic. This leaves three people for two slots and the choice is terribly difficult, if possible.

The difficulty, as I understand it, is that Helene and Nick are counterposed, both being considered for the same slot. It would be absurd for me to pretend that Helene isn't more favored, or that I don't know this. In all honesty I can't say I object too much to this either, because I think it's instructive that "my slate," discussed above, has both of them listed. But I certainly don't want Helene added just kind of automatically without a full consideration of Nick's abilities. If I stress Nick's strengths overmuch, or Helene's weaknesses, it ought to be seen from this perspective here.

Now, I am not Nick's champion, and it would be insulting to him to say he needed one. Further, Nick and I have been personally close since 1966 and the factional brawl in the Iowa Socialist League, before either of us were involved in the SL. This invariably introduces a subjective element. At the same time I have nothing but contempt for sentimentality in political struggle, and I think I've been as severe on him when I didn't like what he was doing as anyone

in the movement. He has an authority problem, which translates into lining people up in a semi-factional manner, and also of taking a bull-dog stance on trivial differences, until his tenacity magnifies them wholly out of proportion. Such a situation cannot but produce friction and grievances.

But it would be wrong to see this as too much more than common, everyday friction. As for Nick's personal problems: they're real but, for that matter, so are Reuben's. I frankly don't think that what's wrong with Nick is of a magnitude--or even pushing it--to bar him from playing such a role. It would have been terrible to use Reuben's problems as a bar to keep him from exercising the authority he should in the youth, since he was obviously more qualified--in a qualitative sense, again--than any other possible contender for that role. Similarly, I think Nick's editorship of Workers Vanguard has been on the whole excellent; why should he be qualified at that post and not for the full CC? I know again there have been some frictions around the paper. To the extent I've heard of them they seem peripheral.

How then does Nick stack up against Helene? About equally, I would say. Nick is, politically speaking, pretty much of a co-thinker with me--that is, we look at events from about the same angle of vision and generally the same criteria, although certainly we don't always agree. As to Helene's political views on a whole range of topics, I just don't know; to what extent she's an independent thinker, I don't know, either; I have seen her give excellent agitational-type statements of our line, giving them a creative thrust. But in this area of work I really don't know her well enough to judge.

Except for a few months in the South several years ago, Nick hasn't been out of the center much; therefore I dare say he doesn't have much of a concrete feel for the organization. This is Helene's forte, and she deals with people on the whole pretty well. She took a gigantic responsibility over several years ago in terms of maintaining it as a holding action, and given what she had to work with, did something I doubt very much I could have. (I have a thesis, being developed elsewhere, that the techniques she used to hold together the BA when it was a holding action became an active barrier to transforming it into a nationally-integrated living local, since these largely personalist methods excluded and prevented the development of a real collective leadership. But at the present time that's an opinion, not a proven fact.) So again I come to the conclusion these people are peers, with differing aspects developed, with real weaknesses on both sides, and no searching, qualitative differences on either side. And I think both are qualified.

Again, I fail to see the value, necessity or point of a slate fight.

I hate writing letters like this--too platitudinous, too testimonial-like, too on-the-one-hand-and-on-the-other. And probably just enough to infuriate everyone.

One concluding observation:

If one of the considerations of the 'balancing' of the slate has anything to do with left-center-right shades, then it's out of date anyway. It would stand to reason that the political average of the organization, with the kind and amount of recruiting we've been doing, has shifted to the right. I don't believe in proportional representation of unconscious tendencies, but in counter-balance. This will be especially true if we anticipate a real, sizeable fusion. I'm not looking for 'factional' allies but I am looking for range and balance. The projected CC is not overloaded on the left now; an infusion of ..., based on my observation of ..., will only strengthen that shift. Maybe that's why I'm soft on Nick and a semi-advocate for him. Further, while they're in their over-correcting stage the ... grouping may make a lot of 'workerist' noises, they will in reality reflect what they know, and what they know best is not what they're enthusing over now but what they've gotten the feel of in the arenas where ... had them working. (Example:....) We had to face this question directly in the youth; it would seem to me proper to bring it up here. As an analogy, let me observe that the first decade of the CPUSA would have been a hell of a lot different if it had solely been composed of the left of the old Hilquit SP, without the balance of the syndicalists, anarchists and IWW. That represented real balance.

I will try to get the BA report in as soon as possible.

Fraternally,

Dave C.

ACCOUNT OF RECENT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

by Liz Gordon

The internal developments of the past few weeks broke into the open suddenly with the abrupt resignation of Treiger from the Spartacist League. The underhanded, guerilla-warfare methods of the dissident grouping which had crystallized, unknown to the central party leadership until immediately before Treiger left, and the cowardly manner of his departure, without having as of this date even submitted a written resignation statement, mean that the overwhelming bulk of the information crucial to any debate over the issues consists of often unverified reports of verbal discussions, many of which were kept secret at the time. In order to discuss the internal situation and even determine whether there are differences within the organization over the issues raised, the testimony of the various comrades involved must be put in writing so that the information will be available throughout the organization and, equally important, so that it can be checked and challenged and the simple facts verified. This account, which is an attempt at a summary of the existing fragmentary information gleaned from verbal accounts, may also be useful in providing the comrades with a picture of what myself and others knew, or thought we knew, as we attempted, beginning only very recently, to develop tentative hypotheses on the unfolding internal situation.

Confrontation with Treiger

One event which appears in hindsight to have considerable importance was a secret meeting of the Political Bureau on 28 Feb. 1972. Comrade Jim Robertson had become concerned over what appeared to be a pattern of constant and increasing tensions between himself and Treiger. Initially consulting Comrade Nelson and myself, he discussed the possibility of arranging a confrontation to explain to Treiger his grievances, suspicions and fears in the hope of clearing the air and eliciting a response from Treiger which would open the way to a more collaborative organizational relationship for the future. Robertson also sought out Comrade George Crawford, a close collaborator of Treiger in the CWC; in recent months both Crawford and Comrade George Foster had been working closely with the PB, often coming to New York to attend its meetings, and with the National Office. Robertson explained that he was concerned about frictions with Treiger and requested Crawford's advice on how Treiger would react to such a confrontation. Crawford's opinion was that Treiger had generally responded well rather than subjectively to criticism and concurred in the proposal.

The PB meeting took place shortly thereafter. It was closed to all but full PB members. Full minutes were taken but were never distributed and the meeting was not given a number. This was a deliberate policy. The purpose was to seek a frank airing of criticism and an exploration of possible differences within the PB without damaging Treiger's authority by making criticisms of him public within the organization. This is the only time in the history of the Spartacist tendency that a regular body of the organization has ever had a deliberately secret, not merely closed, meeting.

The minutes of the meeting are not yet available. Let me summarize from memory the important points taken up, with the understanding

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that other comrades who were present will challenge anything they believe to be incorrect.

Robertson made the main presentation as it was on his initiative that the meeting had been called. He told the meeting that he had felt a lot of tension, and expressed resentment and criticism of Treiger in several areas: Treiger had repeatedly expressed a desire to become fully integrated into the day-to-day functioning of the National Office but in Robertson's opinion showed little real interest and/or capacity for this work. Treiger did not spend much time around the N.O. and hardly ever used his desk there. He was generally uninformed about routine functioning and therefore, Robertson said, his suggestions on N.O. work and procedures were rarely useful. Robertson pointed out that Treiger was good at, and seemed to enjoy, propagandistic work as a writer for Workers Vanguard and as a public speaker, and that the organization had made heavy use of him in both capacities, incorporating him on the Editorial Board of WV along with Benjamin and Gordon and scheduling public meetings for him around the country. Robertson repeated his characterization that the stability of the SL had in the pre-fusion period rested on Robertson-Nelson-Gordon supported by Cunningham, with several other comrades making frequent and extremely valuable creative contributions in the working out of a line. Robertson stressed that he had tried very hard to demonstrate good faith to Treiger and the desire to incorporate him in the central leadership. He pointed to Treiger's extensive national tour shortly after the fusion as an evidence of good faith in giving Treiger access to all areas of the SL and its members. He repeated an earlier proposal made to Treiger that Treiger take answering correspondence from our locals as one of his central responsibilities, one proposed method for incorporating Treiger into the administration of the organization.

Robertson criticized Treiger's conduct in a discussion held in Boston between an SL delegation and the Communist Tendency which had recently been expelled from the SWP. He stated that Treiger had ostentatiously separated himself from the rest of the delegation on the key issue in dispute between the SL and the CT at that meeting ("Proletarian Military Policy") and referred to subsequent internal CT correspondence which stated that evidently Treiger had not yet been incorporated into the so-called Robertson clique. Treiger explained that he had been unaware that his intervention had been wrong, due to inexperience in the organization and unfamiliarity with our methods of functioning, and referred to discussions between the SL and the CWC in which differences had been openly expressed. Robertson stated he considered such an explanation unacceptable from an experienced communist politician.

Robertson stated that at the time of the fusion Plenum Treiger had had a knife out for Comrade Joseph Seymour and had intervened flamboyantly in the RCY Conference in an attempt to destroy Seymour's authority in the youth, and had propelled a rotten bloc against Seymour in the party Plenum's commission on the woman question. Robertson castigated the attempt to establish himself in the organization at the expense of another comrade. Robertson stated he had sought to stop Treiger's undermining of Seymour and had insisted Treiger's criticisms of any "bulge" in the youth be taken up in the PB before Seymour's peers.

Robertson expressed bitter resentment at what he felt were sniping attacks on him and characterized Treiger's earlier complaint that expenditures from the Robertson-Gordon-Rogers trip to the West Coast were not sufficiently itemized as being a veiled suggestion that Robertson might be guilty of financial irregularities in handling the organization's money. Robertson pointed out that immediately following this complaint Gordon had spent a night carefully itemizing the tour expenses, as verified by charge account receipts for gas, auto repair and other expenses, but that Treiger had dropped the matter without paying much attention.

In a PB meeting Treiger had raised the question of the National Office correspondence files, initially proposing that all PB members be issued keys to the one locked file drawer. Robertson had replied that this would result in anarchy. He had explained that one necessary criterion for national officers was that they be responsible in technical matters but that this is not necessarily the case with all PB members, as the political leadership was selected to include a number of qualities. Robertson had explained the distinction between political and administrative functions, insisting that as the person currently responsible for the files he had the obligation to control access to them. He had explained that CC members have a right to all information of a fuller and more detailed basis than non-CC SL members but that ensuring this while resisting anarchy demanded coordination through a centralizing apparatus, a system of established procedures for which one person must be responsible. He had stressed that he had often berated some PB members for insufficient attention to their political responsibility to read all correspondence, but insisted there had to be procedures for doing this without removing material from the office or disorganizing what filing system there was. He had insisted that the person responsible for coordinating access to correspondence need not be himself but that it had to be one person--at present, it was Robertson. Robertson characterized Treiger's motive as a desire to imply Robertson wanted to conceal information.

Robertson also expressed resentment at Treiger's performance in the PB, which he characterized as irresponsible. He cited instances which he believed demonstrated that Treiger had impeded efficient PB functioning by asking that additional discussions be scheduled on questions where he had not been fully convinced of positions shared by a majority of, or all, other comrades, in particular a discussion on New Zealand where Treiger had requested a second meeting to clarify his doubts about the desirability of sending two comrades there, stating after the second discussion that he agreed with the policy after all.

Robertson urged Treiger to clarify what he believed the problems were and warned Treiger that he himself responded to pressure tactics by hardening rather than yielding, and thus such methods were the surest way to precipitate a fight. He stated he always tried to express his criticisms of comrades most sharply in their presence so that they would know where they stood and nobody would be able to undermine his authority by repeating to comrades anything which he had not already told them to their face.

(This obviously cannot be a complete report of Robertson's remarks,

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nor can I state positively that I have not telescoped any points made by Robertson to Treiger at other times, although I have omitted some such points which I suspect were made to Treiger elsewhere than at that meeting.)

My recollection of Treiger's response is far less complete. It was generally mild in tone. Treiger said that at the time of the fusion he had been unsure one way or another about the organizational criticisms raised of Robertson and his role in the SL, especially by Turner, and had wanted to probe in order to make up his mind. He stated he considered himself generally alert to intrigues but was not himself an intriguer.

"Moore Case"

The only other serious dispute in the organization developed in the course of several months over the functioning of Comrade Bill Moore, our representative in Germany, culminating in the demand that he return to the U.S. for a confrontation with the PB over his work in Germany. PB minutes and other material dealing with the "Moore case" are being fully circulated within the organization. The minutes demonstrate substantial agreement in the PB over the political and organizational issues involved. There was disagreement over what Comrade Moore's response would be to the serious criticisms levelled against him; most of the PB felt strongly that Moore would not accept the PB's condemnation of his conduct and would leave the organization; Cunningham, as well as Moore's close working associate John Sharpe, believed Moore would agree to come to the U.S. for a confrontation. It was deemed extremely important by the PB that information on the dispute with Moore be kept strictly confidential within the full CC in order that the prediction that Moore would leave the SL not become a self-fulfilling prophecy by facing Moore with a membership lined up against him. The incident was favorably resolved when Moore returned for the confrontation with the PB: after the discussions Moore wrote a statement setting forth his agreement with the policy and procedures worked out and jointly signed a letter written by Robertson and checked by other PB members, to the German groups. However, in our opinion Comrade Moore's subsequent conduct has not embodied the agreed-upon policy on how our representatives should function and their responsibility to act as disciplined agents of the organization.

The latest incident was that when Comrade Judy Stuart arrived back in the U.S. about a week ago she did not contact Comrade Robertson and when phoned by him told him she had "nothing official to report" on her stay in Europe, during which she had visited several groups in London as well as having spent some months in Germany. When threatened by Robertson with possible disciplinary action she agreed to give him a report and met with him and myself for a discussion.

Letters from Moore-Stuart over an incident involving a young comrade--which Moore-Stuart apparently considered an attempt by the SL leadership to persecute a personal supporter of Moore--are also being circulated.

Early Slate Differences

A potentially serious dispute within the organization seemed to be taking shape over the question of the CC slate to be recommended by the outgoing PB to the forthcoming National Conference. Robertson's presentation to PB #49 of 20 May (minutes available) offered several possible explanations of what appeared to be diverging impulses on slate: (1) simply varying assessments of individuals and their qualifications; (2) differing criteria for the consideration of individuals or differing conceptions of what kind of qualities should be represented within the leadership in the attempt to construct a responsible, balanced and authoritative collective; (3) uncongealed or unexpressed political differences, referring to the 1939 SWP example.

Discussion had already begun in particular around the question of Comrade Helene Brosius, about whom PB comrades had been strongly divided. (An anti-Brosius clique grouped around Comrade Nick Benjamin in NYC was confronted in the branch and was voluntarily dissolved by its supporters.)

A general recommendation (worked out in consultation with Comrade Benjamin) was offered by Robertson and adopted by the PB to table further discussion on slate to a later meeting after PB members Nelson, Cunningham and Treiger had returned from the West Coast and in which Brosius would also be present.

Another discussion which promised to be quite lively was taking shape over the question of our UAW perspective. An initial exchange of letters between Comrade Chris Kinder, the Trade Union Director, and Comrade Judson S., the Chicago organizer and de facto head of our potential national UAW fraction, had indicated the possibility of some fairly serious disagreements over general guidelines as well as the projected timetable and emphasis of implementation of our UAW work.

This, then, was the general background and apparent possible disagreements within the organization as of perhaps a month ago.

Expanded PB Prepared

Several months ago, before his second trip to the West Coast, Treiger had accepted the assignment to prepare the first draft of the main resolution for the National Conference, with the assistance of a drafting commission. Following his return from his second tour one meeting of the commission had been held and he had agreed to prepare at least an outline of the draft document for the commission's next meeting, proposed for perhaps a week or ten days after the first.

The composition and scope proposed for the expanded PB, #50, held 24-25 June, took shape gradually. In response to the UAW dispute Comrade Robertson on behalf of the National Office phoned Comrade Judson urging him to attend a PB meeting to be scheduled, where time would be allotted for a lengthy discussion on UAW which also would include the participation of at least Comrade Foster, involved in this work in another area. Coinciding with this would be the slate discussion, as Treiger, Nelson and Brosius would all be in town shortly.

First Evidences of Trouble

The first intimation that something was going on came in a phone conversation between Comrade Tweet Carter in Los Angeles and Comrade Robertson. Some time earlier a discussion had taken place in the PB, initiated by Treiger; in reporting on his first trip to the West Coast Treiger raised the question of Comrade George Rep and was highly critical of his irresponsible functioning. Treiger suggested that if Rep did not improve he should possibly be ordered out of the Bay Area, perhaps to Boston where several comrades of the former CWC, who knew him well and had been critical of his past performance, would be looking over his shoulder. When Treiger, Nelson and Cunningham left for the Coast, Robertson told each of them to warn Comrade Rep that his poor functioning called into question his authority and leading role in the organization. He also conveyed this to Carter in Los Angeles by phone.

Carter was strongly in favor of Rep's continuation on the CC. She told Robertson that the policy he projected with regard to Rep must be an informal decision because Treiger and Cunningham denied knowledge of such a policy, and criticized Robertson for presenting his opinions as established policy. Robertson replied that he could not explain the divergence between Carter's account and the account attributed to Cunningham, and after phoning Cunningham to hear his account, Robertson phoned Carter and asserted that it appears that "one of you is lying." Having never known either of them to lie, he said, he could not judge from a distance without more information.

About two weeks ago Carter called again, speaking first with me and then with Robertson who was then in Boston for the weekend. She reported that Treiger and Cunningham were both backing Rep for full CC, and expressed concern over several other items: that Cunningham had been extremely critical of Nelson's functioning in the Bay Area as having been initially lined up by Brosius, and had predicted that Nelson would not be able to handle his permanent assignment in the Bay Area and would probably leave politics. She said Cunningham had been critical of Gordon on the grounds that Gordon had not made the leap from understanding the tasks of a sub-propaganda group to the present tasks as a vanguard nucleus. She said she was disturbed when Cunningham had given her his opinion of who were the valuable leading comrades of the SL because Gordon had not been mentioned. She expressed the strong suspicion that there had been some kind of coming together on a slate proposal, which included Rep, Benjamin, Brosius and Moore as full CC members, and that Rep was arguing that Cunningham qualified for the post of Deputy National Chairman. She reported rumors that Robertson might be dying and wanted to appoint his successor.

At this point we became apprehensive because there appeared to be a certain political common denominator--a thrust--to the slate proposal reported by Carter, and in addition the information strongly suggested that a subterranean lining-up process was taking place, after the PB had voted to postpone the discussion until the return to New York of the PB comrades on assignment to the Coast and the arrival of Brosius. We were becoming convinced that what was at issue in the slate fight was far more serious than differing assessments and

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estimations of individuals, but rather the placing of a supreme and exclusive value on literary theoretical capacity and the downgrading of other components which must have a place in a balanced communist leadership. In addition Benjamin and especially Rep were organizationally irresponsible and had been heavily criticized for their functioning while the proposal to add Moore, whose loyalty to the organization we felt was heavily in question, was inflammatory to the extreme. Moreover a similar slate proposal had been raised to Robertson by a comrade on the East Coast (Comrade Libby Schaefer). Robertson believed she had attributed the proposal to Treiger. Robertson had responded to her with vehemence about the proposal of Moore but refrained from raising broader implications of the proposal.

Immediately following the call from Carter, Robertson presented Carter's information in a heated manner privately to the full CC members in the Boston area, Crawford and Foster. Crawford then mentioned a conversation he had had with Treiger some time earlier, which he said had disturbed him at the time. Treiger had presented the position that: Robertson surrounds himself in the leadership with yes men; he had characterized PB meetings as dull and almost inevitably unanimous, dominated by Robertson who always summarized the consensus of the discussion and made the motions; he had described Comrade Libby Schaefer as the only comrade who ever stood up to Robertson.

Crawford said he had replied by explaining he believed it was natural Robertson would play this kind of role in the leadership considering his greater experience as a communist politician and his considerable authority in the eyes of other comrades. Crawford had said he had asked Treiger whether he had ever felt that he himself could have made a better motion, or whether he had ever known a superior motion to be voted down because Robertson had proposed a different one, and Treiger had replied that he had not.

The apparent flat contradiction from Los Angeles and the other information conveyed in the call from Carter, as well as Crawford's report on his conversation with Treiger, were discussed among Robertson, Nelson and myself. We made the hypothesis, subject to verification, that Treiger was conducting an underground struggle against the rest of the leadership and surreptitiously pushing a slate proposal, and that Cunningham was at least reflecting this and probably had guilty knowledge, if he was not an accomplice.

Shortly thereafter Robertson phoned Cunningham, who denied supporting Rep for full CC. Robertson suggested that Cunningham cut short his stay on the Coast and return to New York for the scheduled PB discussion on slate. Cunningham replied he felt it was important to remain on the Coast because of the organizational role he was playing in holding the Bay Area local together.

Treiger had at this time been back from his trip to the Coast for several weeks. We had seen very little of him and it had been generally observed that he and Comrade Benjamin, an inveterate if indiscriminate cliquist, were having frequent and lengthy private discussions, and that Treiger and Rogers were also spending a lot of time together.

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As the conception for the expanded PB and its composition and agenda became more precise, it became clear that this meeting would be the obvious place to consider the first draft of the main resolution for the National Conference. Robertson became concerned about getting in touch with Treiger to urge him to have his first draft prepared for the meeting. When Treiger was finally located and Robertson went over to see him, Treiger told him that he had realized three days before that he would not be able to do the document because of an insufficient familiarity with Trotskyism and the SL. Treiger suggested that Gordon be asked to do the document; Robertson replied that Gordon's first priority was the production of an issue of Spartacist, already too long delayed, oriented heavily to the international movement. Robertson expressed the fear that failure to produce it might precipitate a final showdown and split on the part of Comrade Moore, who had strongly pressed for the production of the International Discussion Bulletin and had been extremely critical of the national office for sluggishness, inefficiency, incompetence and presumed disregard for the importance of international work. It was now about a week before the expanded PB.

Later that evening Robertson summarized his discussion with Treiger to me and suggested we ought to consider asking Comrade Joseph Seymour to do the document when he returned from a maritime job, and perhaps avoid a Conference postponement by opening pre-Conference discussion with a first bulletin containing the documents from the last Plenum, with other material as well as Seymour's draft to follow thereafter. We discussed the hypothesis that part of Treiger's inability to do the document might stem from the fact that the Transformation document from the Plenum was still extremely pertinent and perhaps Treiger had found himself without a lot to say. I agreed that Robertson's proposal might be an answer but was disinclined to let Treiger off the hook so easily, suggesting that since we could not reach Seymour anyway we might wait a few days before offering a possible answer to the threat to the Conference scheduling produced by Treiger's default, since he had neither acted responsibly by informing us nor troubled to think of a reasonable alternative which might salvage a Labor Day Conference.

A few days before Treiger's resignation, Robertson and myself had a brief discussion with Comrade Nedy R. in the National Office, in which she stated she had been approached by Treiger with criticisms of the way Joe Johnson and his circle of black sympathizers in Los Angeles had been handled. Treiger explained that he had opposed the energetic attempt to seek extended discussion and possible recruitment among the Johnson circle, because it was doomed to failure since they were burned out, but the PB had insisted this was an important opportunity which had to be pursued to a definitive conclusion. Nedy expressed the opinion that this was an attempt to line her up since the problem of how to handle this work and its failure had been the subject of much agonizing debate and subsequent demoralization in the Los Angeles local.

During the last week before the PB Robertson twice more phoned Cunningham and presented to him full reports on the situation as it seemed to be developing. He told Cunningham his suspicions about what was going on, including questions about Cunningham's own role

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and the hypothesis that Cunningham had guilty knowledge of or involvement in the guerilla war being conducted over slate. Cunningham was consistently unresponsive, denied any knowledge much less involvement and volunteered no information. In particular, Robertson raised apprehensions regarding Cunningham's wife, Rogers.

We Launch a Struggle on Slate

On Friday afternoon, the day before the expanded PB was scheduled to begin, Comrade Helene Brosius arrived in New York. Figuring that Treiger would likely have approached Brosius--as a comrade possibly disaffected due to the recent Bay Area showdown initiated by Robertson, and as a comrade who had always been somewhat reserved toward the central party leadership--Robertson wanted to de-brief her about Treiger's role on the West Coast and also discuss with her our position on the slate discussion. In Brosius' presence (and mine) Robertson phoned Treiger and told him the following: For some weeks Robertson had been worried by aspects of the slate discussion shaping up and the proposals which had been associated with Treiger, and was suspicious of Treiger's conduct on the West Coast. Robertson castigated Treiger for discussing his proposals with other comrades but not with his PB colleagues. He characterized the conception behind the alternative slate proposal as "the beautiful people vs. the clods" (in favor of the former) and stated the opinion that this conception was an extremely dangerous one which would change the basis of our organization and the way its leadership is selected. He explained that he intended to wage a fight at the expanded PB meeting and that Brosius' arrival had precipitated him into action because he wanted to discuss the question with her and other leading comrades outside the full PB members in preparation for the discussion--which he had not yet done. He pointed out vehemently that to go behind Treiger's back would have been a gross violation of responsible procedure in a leading comrade. He told Treiger that Robertson and I had drawn up and agreed upon our slate proposal, to be presented at the PB, the very night that Treiger had broken an appointment for a general discussion with us. He stated he considered Treiger had broken off all personal relations with him, and in six weeks since his return from the Coast and had never managed to meet for a discussion, having broken several appointments. Treiger replied that he had indeed had one such discussion; Robertson at first did not remember but upon being reminded stated he had forgotten it because nothing significant had been taken up. After hanging up, Robertson reported to Brosius and myself that Treiger had been mild in tone without giving an inch and had refused to state what proposals he supported, asking instead what Robertson had been told by Schaefer.

Robertson and I then presented to Brosius our slate and our accumulated evidences of a subterranean fight, and asked Brosius to tell us what she knew about it. Brosius was critical of herself for not having contacted Robertson about a discussion she had had with Treiger on the West Coast and reported on it. This discussion, lasting several hours, was the fullest elaboration of Treiger's views on the leadership we had yet (or subsequently) heard. Treiger presented the position that Robertson's regime was bureaucratic, made many important political decisions informally without full consultation or discussion in the proper bodies and insisted on its own pre-

ferences for how the National Office should function thereby stifling initiative from others. The political climate in New York was described as arid, with no real struggle or even lively political discussion taking place. Treiger also severely criticized Robertson's conception of how a leadership should function; he cited Robertson's allusion to Cannon's attitude toward John G. Wright; Cannon considered Wright to be a talented theoretician who was easy to denigrate and often not taken seriously; and Cannon declared that anyone who wanted to "get" Wright would have to "get" Cannon first. Treiger explained that this concept was the protection of weaklings and incompetents, and that if a leader could not protect himself from abuse he should be permitted to in effect go under. The picture emerged of an inefficient, undemocratic and hidebound regime, propping up degenerate elements, in a stultifying political atmosphere in which the only creative people had been presumably brutalized and burned out. Treiger also remarked that of course Robertson was not what he used to be.

Brosius stressed that she had strongly insisted to Treiger that he must take up these criticisms directly with Robertson upon his return to New York, and that Treiger had agreed to do so. Brosius said she found it hard to believe he had not. She also predicted that nobody would back Rep for full CC as all the comrades on the West Coast were strongly critical of his functioning.

Expanded PB--First Day

The majority of the discussion on the first day of the expanded PB meeting was devoted to the UAW dispute. Significant left/right shadings emerged but the divergences were considerably narrowed from what had originally been presented in the exchange of correspondence between Kinder and Judson (to be attached to the PB minutes in question). Treiger made no intervention into the UAW discussion. During the meal break Brosius approached Treiger stating that she had discussed their earlier conversation with Robertson and asking if he wanted to discuss with her further, specifying that she would feel free to communicate anything he said. Treiger replied he did not want to talk.

That night following the meeting I was discussing our tentative assessment of the internal situation and the fragmentary evidence with three full CC members who had not been fully informed of the situation as we saw it (Foster, Crawford and Samuels--the latter had not previously been told anything at all) in preparation for the next day's discussion when another comrade who was working in the office told me that Treiger was phoning for Robertson. When I arrived home Robertson told me that he had not been at home to receive the call since he had still been out talking with Comrades Seymour, Cantor and Schaefer. Robertson was initially disinclined to return the call but was persuaded, but was unable to reach Treiger whose line was busy.

Second Day

Just as we were leaving for the second day of the meeting on Sunday Robertson received a call from Treiger, who informed him that

he was resigning from the Spartacist League and would turn in a written resignation statement that day. Robertson replied, "You bastard-- come down to the meeting and fight" and hung up.

The minutes of the ensuing second session of the enlarged PB have already been worked up by the PB secretary and are being circulated.

During the meal break Robertson met privately and separately with Benjamin and Rogers. Rogers' remarks can be summarized as follows: Treiger was deeply demoralized and intended to be inactive politically for at least six months, as he had come to doubt the validity or viability of the Trotskyist movement after the death of Trotsky. For some years Rogers had had the position that Robertson and Gordon considered the SL their own personal property and were responsible for Cunningham's failure to make a success of his role in the organization. Cunningham, Rogers (his wife) and Benjamin (his best friend) had discussed grievances against the regime privately among themselves over a long period without ever raising them to Robertson or other SL leaders and had been too cowardly to make a fight against the leadership. She stated she felt she was partly responsible for Treiger's course because she had presented this position to him. Rogers and Benjamin stated that after years of fearing to wage a struggle they and Treiger had finally geared themselves up for a confrontation that day after which they had intended to leave the organization. Both comrades admitted they had been actively considering resigning from the organization for at least a week. In another private discussion during the break, this time with Crawford, Rogers stated she had advised Treiger against discussing his grievances directly with Robertson.

The content of these discussions with Rogers and Benjamin was not explicitly presented to the PB session when it reconvened. However these revelations and Treiger's abrupt resignation cast a new light on the internal party situation. Robertson made the characterization that Treiger, who had become organizationally unstable and demoralized, had canvassed the organization looking for weaknesses, and had found "the Cunningham clot." It was projected that Cunningham rather than Treiger had been the driving force behind the slate fight.

Following the adjournment of the meeting that night a team of several comrades phoned Comrades Goldenfeld and Rep in the Bay Area and Comrades Victor G. and John Sheridan in Los Angeles, informing them of Treiger's resignation and some of the background. The West Coast comrades expressed hostility to Treiger's having walked out without a fight.

Peeling the Onion

The next day, Monday, and again the following day, Rogers sought out Robertson for a private discussion concerning her personal perspectives and her desire to fly out to the Bay Area to talk to Cunningham. In the course of this discussion she stated that over the past week she had several times spoken to Cunningham over the phone and that he was aware of her and Benjamin's intention to wage a last-ditch anti-regime struggle and resign. She stated that Cunningham

had strongly urged her not to do so and told her to break from Treiger-Benjamin.

Robertson presented to Rogers the characterization that Cunningham and his two personal intimates had sealed themselves off and endlessly discussed their grievances, losing contact with reality. Rogers admitted she now believed they had been guilty of severe paranoia. Robertson instructed Rogers to communicate with the center within 48 hours after her arrival in the Bay Area in order to find out Cunningham's response to the extensive analysis and urgings that Robertson presented to Rogers to communicate to Cunningham in an effort to lay the basis for some means of redeveloping a collective central leadership.

Over the Monday-Tuesday following the enlarged PB Robertson also phoned Cunningham directly and on the basis of the direct and explicit evidence from Rogers and from Benjamin charged him with having failed in his elementary responsibility as part of a collective leadership by denying his knowledge of his wife's and best friend's mounting intention to resign from the organization with Treiger. Cunningham admitted knowing of this intention but said that he "did not know what it meant." Robertson replied heatedly that it was the job of the collective to figure out "what it meant" without Cunningham exercising veto power over crucial information. He characterized Cunningham as having a conception of himself as the left-wing guardian of the SL and stated that the Cunningham-Rogers-Benjamin grouping could hardly be considered any sort of "left" "tendency" since its supporters were able to so smoothly transfer over their allegiance to Treiger, (whom Cunningham has always considered a rightist). He urged Cunningham not to attempt to "brazen it out."

In a discussion with Comrade Carter shortly before she left to return to Los Angeles, she presented the following information: She stated that following publication of the December 1971 issue of WV heavily featuring the SLL-OCI split she had approached Cunningham with her opinion that Robertson was too soft on the OCI, and that he had agreed, characterizing Gordon as a rightist and Robertson as a rapidly rightward-moving center element on the question: that he had stated that the line on the IC split in WV had been the product of himself and Benjamin, who had successfully blocked a rightist line on the part of Robertson and Gordon.

Carter also discussed with us the attempt to constitute a united front with Johnson-Fagin in Los Angeles over the Work Stoppage Committee tactic following Nixon's reescalation of the Vietnam war, stating that Cunningham had pursued an opportunist policy and had denounced her and the local to a close contact as sectarian. The only available written material dealing with the incident is being circulated. We urged Carter to immediately put into writing all her assertions of a factual nature bearing on the disputes.

Subsequently, in discussions with myself, Robertson, Nelson and others, Comrade Benjamin said the Cunningham-Benjamin grouping had always considered it necessary to wait for a favorable time in order to launch a struggle. He also said he had been extremely upset with Cunningham because Cunningham had recently separated himself from opposition to Brosius being considered for the PB, leaving Benjamin

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holding the bag. Cunningham argued, he said, that he'd changed his mind, that it didn't matter that she was not a Marxist because Brosius was not a "hand-raiser" for Robertson and that was more important. Robertson and I discussed this and agreed it might indicate the point at which Cunningham abandoned the role of self-appointed "left" protector of the SL and became an anti-regime combinationist. Benjamin also said that on the phone Cunningham had told Benjamin and Treiger to leave Cunningham's wife (Rogers) alone (i.e. not to take her out in the split) and had threatened them with physical violence if they did not.

Yesterday Comrade Libby Schaefer approached Comrade Robertson for a private discussion, in which she stated that shortly after the secret PB (which neither Schaefer nor Rogers had attended) Rogers had told her that the regime was moving to destroy Treiger just as it had destroyed Cunningham and projected the desirability of a central leadership excluding Robertson, Nelson and Gordon.

In a discussion of the Treiger defection and related issues at a special meeting of the Boston SL branch held last Monday, Comrade Judy Stuart stated that she had received three calls from Treiger in the week since her return Europe including one the Saturday night before he ran out. In at least the last call he had expressed his intention to resign from the SL. Stuart had not informed the National Office at the time but volunteered this information in the Boston branch meeting.

Recent phone conversations between comrades in the center and in the Bay Area indicate that a local decision had been made to keep the fact of the Treiger defection from the SL ranks until a membership meeting was held, which meeting however was not scheduled until Saturday, 1 July. In a conversation with full CC member Comrade Gene Goldenfeld during the week, Robertson had discussed the problem of avoiding wild speculations and rumors in the branch but urged Goldenfeld to inform the membership during the week when he contacted individual members for the projected meeting. Comrade Sue Adams, the Bay Area organizer, spoke with Brosius stating she had not been consulted and that Goldenfeld and Cunningham had decided on the interim concealment policy by themselves.

A discussion on Treiger's resignation and the internal situation was held in the New York branch Tuesday night, and was taped; Los Angeles had their meeting on Wednesday night immediately upon Comrade Carter's return to the area.

Let us hope that this report, and the challenges which may subsequently be made to its accuracy or veracity, will establish some factually agreed upon basis in which to interpret the events and their developing significance.

--29 June 1972

CLIQUE, BLOCS AND THE REGIME

by Liz Gordon

It is now five days since Marvin Treiger's resignation that he was resigning from the Spartacist League. A great deal more has come to light about what has been going on. The picture that emerges is best encapsulated in Treiger's methodological characterization to the New York Times on Tuesday that there is indeed a "regime" in the SL, and that indeed there has been a "Byzantine cellar," but the Byzantine cellar was not the regime.

The Byzantine Cellar

Treiger's resignation precipitated a series of confessions, which are perhaps not over yet, of complicity in or at least direct knowledge of vicious and ingrown personal cliques in the SL. The rampant, obvious cliquist proclivities of Comrade Nick Benjamin had been congenital but universally known and therefore generally not taken very seriously. A hard clique around Comrades Bill Moore and Judy Stuart originating in Boston--consisting of personal friends, admirers and recruits--has been a constant factor of organizational life for some time and had been principally, although not entirely, responsible for the counterposed situation which poisoned the Boston local for two years. Following Moore's departure last fall for Germany, where he has been our representative, the methods of clique warfare and defiance of the Political Bureau and National Office by Moore-Stuart continued.

Personal ties between Moore, Benjamin and Comrade David Cunningham date back to personal and political association preceding these comrades' joining the SL.

In the weeks immediately preceding Treiger's resignation he, Benjamin and Comrade Janet Rogers (Cunningham's wife) appeared to be consolidating a new clique alignment. As explained in my "Account" document we then viewed Treiger as the probable motive force of this development.

Treiger's resignation was a bombshell. Rogers and Benjamin admitted then that they and Treiger had been considering in mounting frenzy resigning from the organization for at least a week. Benjamin's position on the regime was well known: [the party is a Byzantine cellar of intrigue, cliquism, favoritism, bureaucratism and brutal oppression; Robertson is a despot surrounded by loyal apparatchniks and hand-raisers lacking intelligence, sensitivity, creativity or education in Marxism.] What stunned the central leadership and cadres, however, was the revelation that for some years, with varying intensity, Cunningham and Rogers had shared a deeply hostile attitude toward the leadership in general and Robertson and Gordon in particular, considering themselves as sharply counterposed to the regime rather than an integral and trusted part of it.

This grouping of three comrades--of whom Cunningham has been a member of the PB since the last National Conference and Benjamin and

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Rogers have held down crucial responsibilities in the press and National Office--had discussed their grievances endlessly among themselves but had never raised them openly in the party. Their failure to launch a power struggle against the regime was attributed by Rogers to cowardice and by Benjamin to the desire to find a serious political basis for a fight.

For a period of several months at least Treiger had been surreptitiously canvassing the organization, looking for weak spots. What he found was the Cunningham clique, which was at least loosely personally linked with Moore et al. Politically these elements had had very little in common. In Cunningham's methodology, Cunningham considered himself the left-wing guardian of Spartacist decency, while Treiger was within the framework of SL politics a rightist, and was recognized as such by Cunningham. What Treiger, Cunningham and Moore shared in common was the value placed on Marxist intellectual facility as the supreme and even exclusive criterion for a good communist. Cunningham's supposed appreciation of leftism was at least partly an appreciation of this personal-political style, as he included as a leftist Comrade George Rep, who is a comrade well-read in Marxism who compulsively initiates discussions of general theoretical and political views but whom I would characterize as a rightist-formalist.

Some months ago, Comrade Cunningham went to the West Coast as a representative of the PB. During his absence, first Benjamin and then Rogers had crystallized around Treiger on the regime question, finally gearing themselves up for the final conflict after which they projected resigning. During the week before Treiger's resignation, Cunningham learned--or, if he knew it earlier, began to believe--that this was the intention of his two associates. He attempted to dissuade them, particularly Rogers, from pursuing this course.

Despite being repeatedly contacted by Robertson, who ostentatiously continued attempting to consult and collaborate with Cunningham despite mounting suspicions that Cunningham was at least passively involved in what appeared to be Treiger's operation--suspicions which Robertson repeatedly raised to Cunningham--Cunningham denied all knowledge. When finally confronted with the undeniable fact, attested to by Rogers and Benjamin following Treiger's split, that he had had full knowledge at least by the time of Treiger's resignation, Cunningham replied he hadn't told Robertson of his associates' intention to leave the SL because "I didn't know what it meant."

Cunningham had thus appointed himself the censor over the PB rather than its representative. The position that he didn't report it because he didn't understand it means he considered himself the only competent, or perhaps the only morally untainted, person to judge.

*Bull!
he was afraid*

At least implied is the position that if a struggle is taking place in which political lines are not clear, then it just doesn't exist. Such a conception would constitute a denial that the question

Doesn't
add up

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of organization is itself a political question, and at bottom a denial of the entire Leninist concept of the vanguard party. 1

One must be struck by the similarity between the position Cunningham found himself in and that of Harry Turner. Turner discovered that the faction he thought had been built by him on the basis of his politics was in fact a syndicalist-undergroundist-state-capitalist faction--moreover with a split perspective. Cunningham found that his personal anti-regime clique, considered by him a principled left-critical grouping awaiting a principled difference, had defected to the rightist Treiger, simply and smoothly, and was about to split. In this case however there is considerably more justification for an assertion that Treiger and any others who might go out with him are the "frictional losses." For it is indeed the Cunningham clique--as well as the Moore clique with which Cunningham et al. have for some time maintained a secret personal-political correspondence--which is at the core of the Byzantine cellar, peculiar vegetation which grew and grew in the dark until Treiger's coming unstuck and breaking from the SL turned over the rock and exposed them at last. 2

When Cunningham's personal associates revealed how deeply implicated he was, compromised by years of paranoid cliquism and then directly caught out in a series of flat lies, Cunningham knew he was destroyed in the estimation of those who had respected him and considered him a close collaborator. The truth was out; Cunningham, as had Turner before him, charged on: he decided to go into opposition. 3

The most destructive aspect of this cliquism run amok--the embodiment of every anti-consciousness impulse--is the corruption and destruction of cadres. Those like Schaefer who have come forward to admit not only cliquism but outright deception of the party now face terrible pressure toward simple cop-out, ashamed to face their comrades whom they know will never fully trust them again until they have proven themselves honest and principled in future internal struggle, regardless of what political positions they take. It is in this sense that Comrade Rogers, now a presumed factional opponent, is not only someone whose espoused positions must now be fought but a tragedy as well. Subjective, arrogant cliquists have destroyed the innocence of this organization.

The revelations of cliquism, dishonesty and combinationism have deeply shocked the cadres. Comrade Cunningham was just about universally acknowledged as brilliant and creative, but perhaps more important was accepted throughout the organization at his own valuation as principled, an epitome of communist morality, despite widespread (and entirely open) severe criticisms of his irresponsibility toward some important assignments. Comrade Rogers, less well known generally, was perhaps even more highly appraised by the leading cadres in the center as possessing immense dedication to the movement and good judgment as well as political capacity, less fully developed but potentially of the highest order.

The Regime

Every organization, including the Spartacist League, has a regime. Our regime is those comrades, generally full-time functionaries, responsible for the administration and day-to-day political functioning of the organization under the supervision of the PB. The regime is based on an evolved division of labor and consultation between particular leading comrades, a set of established procedures and practices and a shared set of general attitudes and values. The SL regime has several times been characterized by Comrade Robertson as follows: The stability of the SL over the past period has depended on a division of labor between Robertson, Gordon and Nelson, supported by Cunningham, with other comrades also making frequent valuable creative contributions to the development, formulation and carrying out of political line.

The SL regime places a high value on open and collective evaluation of its components and collaborators. Robertson in particular has always stressed the importance of making his harshest criticisms of comrades directly to them so that he could not be charged with undermining comrades' authority behind their backs. The SL regime practices such a method of proceeding toward comrades as essential to the development of consciousness and of trust between individuals, although for those few supremely arrogant people who are unable to have their egos bruised this in effect constitutes a crucial testing process.

A great deal of important evidence demonstrates that the regime has consistently encouraged other comrades to assume responsible jobs as part of the extension of the collective. This is only reasonable since our small size and the enormity of our tasks creates a situation in which crucial slots are not always filled. Talented, dedicated comrades have so often been thrust into responsible and difficult jobs with untested qualifications and far too limited experience, needing qualitatively more training, assistance and supervision than we are able to provide. Comrade Cunningham, for instance, was brought to the center and charged with the responsibility for editing our central organ simply on the basis of demonstrated creative and prolific capacity as a writer in Iowa City. Cunningham, Gordon and Seymour were thrust to the fore by the Ellens-Turner faction fight, assuming the main literary burden of the discussion. Comrade Helene Brosius had literally thrust upon her the role of political leader and local Organizer in the Bay Area. Comrades Libby Schaefer and Reuben Shiffman, with perhaps four years experience each in the communist movement, have assumed the central leadership of the youth organization. Rogers has been pushed, especially in the past year, to assume assignments which would compel her to intervene politically in the shaping of policy in the SL. Heavy pressure is being brought to bear on Comrade John Sharpe, an SL member for perhaps a year or two, to abandon his academic career and come into the National Office to direct an international secretariat.

And, certainly, what about Treiger? While not concealing from him our assessment that his real talents lay in public propaganda

work, writing and speaking, the regime endorsed his expressed desire to find a role in the central administration and projected to him some assignments working into a proposal of possibly recommending him as National Organizational Secretary, a national officer of the SL, in the future. Early on after the fusion, Robertson and I discussed with Treiger a proposal to constitute an informal working secretariat of the three of us, to meet daily at the office, discuss the day's work and work out a division of labor. In another discussion we raised the possibility that he could take over National Office correspondence with the locals and other related jobs which had in the main fallen on Robertson's shoulders: frequent national tours on behalf of the PB and the responsibility to discuss frequently with individual comrades in New York and elsewhere who were requesting political guidance, or showing signs of political demoralization or personal problems. At the time of his resignation Treiger was slated to give a several-part class on basic Marxist economics for the New York RCY and to take over from me the assignment of PB representative to the local Women and Revolution group here. Treiger had accepted the assignment to head the drafting commission for the main political resolution for the National Conference and write the first draft, and would therefore presumably have been the main political reporter to the Conference.

Treiger's allegations about intimidated, destroyed creative comrades and mindless Robertson-dominated hand-raisers indicate that Treiger wouldn't recognize a collective leadership if he fell over it. Treiger's conception is of individual bright stars parading their own talents and contributions, in competition with one another and seeking originality for its own sake; ours is of an organization and leadership which struggles for cohesiveness rather than against it. We insist that there is and always will be in any organization the development of authority--i.e. confidence in particular comrades by particular others. In the SL such authority is developed not by the intimidating atmosphere which Treiger describes (that wouldn't be authority) but by a process of working together over a period of time in which some comrades are proven to be right more often than others.

It is only within this general framework that the conception of "protecting" valuable but vulnerable comrades has any meaning. It does not mean that the regime will cover up for anyone's political errors or organizational irresponsibility. It does mean that the regime will oppose personally ambitious or not terribly conscious elements irresponsibly and one-sidedly attacking other comrades with the intent or effect of denying the would-be victims' strong points and contributions. For example, Comrade Cunningham could have been destroyed in an instant if a vindictive regime had, following Cunningham's failure to produce a reply to Wohlforth's "What is Spartacist?" pamphlet despite having been relieved of all other assignments for many months, mobilized hard-working but politically undeveloped comrades to destroy his authority, as such comrades undoubtedly represented his default without recognizing his political contributions. Cunningham was heavily criticized for this failure, especially by Robertson, but a high estimation of Cunningham's political strengths continued to be made known within the organization as part of a ba-

lanced appraisal.

This policy is the direct opposite of cliquism. Cliquism requires one personally-based grouping which admits of no defects in itself and a hate list of others about whom it must never be admitted that anything good could be said. The SL regime is extremely careful to demonstrate an even-handed, impartial attitude and consciously scrutinizes its motives to be sure that personal friendships are kept scrupulously separate from organizational conduct. When the slate fight was posed, for instance, Robertson removed from the slate proposal we agreed upon one comrade who might genuinely be considered a "crony" and about whom there was not a general consensus in the cadres regarding his qualifications. Recently several other comrades who have worked closely with this comrade in his area recommended him highly for CC alternate, as had been also our opinion.

A similarity between Treiger and Cunningham has been their inability to face up to and live with their own failures. Treiger's felt inadequacy in the administrative aspect of party life, Cunningham's felt inadequacy in the production of Spartacist--these were translated in their own minds into a refusal by the regime to allow them to successfully carry out these roles. In last Tuesday's discussion in the New York branch Comrade Nelson contrasted this with his own recognition that he had not been a good Trade Union Director and that Comrade Kinder was being far more conscientious and effective. Self-indulgent refusal to face one's failures destroys the possibility of struggling to correct and improve one's performance.

An important point in understanding the SL regime is the separation between political leadership and administration. One of the serious general criticisms made of Comrade Helene Brosius was that in her leadership role in the Bay Area she had strongly tended to amalgamate the two. Brosius, the Organizer of the branch, was at the same time one comrade among equals in the determination of positions in the branch and had the right on administrative functions--e.g. getting a comrade to go on a sale--to invoke formal authority and give orders. Comrade Robertson similarly carries on two kinds of roles. In his capacity as a member of the Political Bureau he is one among equals in the determination of line, seeking to convince his PB colleagues, and casting one vote. In his capacity as National Chairman, chief administrator of a centralized National Office, he has the right and the responsibility (if called upon to exercise it) of insisting that certain administrative tasks be performed, or performed in a certain manner, within the framework of guidelines established by the PB and subject to appeal to the PB.

The development of the slate fight is crucial to an understanding of the values of the SL regime. We characterized the alternative slate proposal as a conception of "the beautiful people vs. the clods"--a separation between aspects of a hard communist leadership which must not merely be balanced but must be fused into a cohesive whole. The polarization of the SWP along the lines of the talented Marxist intellectuals on the one side and the worker-communists on the other in 1939 not only precipitated the petty-bourgeois wing explosively breaking from Marxism then slowly but inevitably finding

its way into the camp of the class enemy. This polarization also facilitated the theoretical incapacity and sterility on the part of those left behind in the SWP and was a crucial element in creating the preconditions for the SWP's Pabloist degeneration.

The capacity to use and develop Marxist theory to understand the world must be linked with the struggle to change it through the intervention of the vanguard organization. The intellectual technician unfamiliar with or disdainful of the workings of the party and its practical capacities and limitations is thus fundamentally flawed because he is unable to make the connection between his world view and his party. It is instructive that Comrade Seymour was not numbered among the "beautiful people" despite his brilliance and creativity as a Marxist intellectual; Seymour destroyed his academic career and placed himself at the disposal of the party and in the year or more since then has become a closely integrated member of the working leadership team.

The creative theoretical and literary capacity of the so-called "beautiful people" and the reliability, skills and dedication of the so-called "clods" should ideally be present in each individual comrade. To the extent it is not, one aim of a collective leadership is to fuse the individuals into a whole which, combining these elements, is greater than the components and transcends the weaknesses of the individuals taken separately. The "beautiful people vs. clods" conception reproduces within the party the class distinctions in bourgeois society as seen through the eyes of the petty-bourgeois academic (thinkers vs. workers).

A final point on regime: Treiger's imputation that Robertson's concern over the National Office files was based on a desire to conceal information was demonstrated to be false when Comrade Nedy R. arrived in town and after a training period was given custody of the files and the authority to initiate her preferred procedures within her own staff department. This is one example of our achievement of a partial division of labor, a series of National Office sub-units under the direction of staff heads for the departments (e.g. WV editorial, WV composition and technical production, circulation, trade-union department, RCY, etc.) reducing Robertson's role in the daily operation of these departments generally to consultation and refereeing disputes.

Where Is Cunningham Going?

I urge the comrades to read very carefully the minutes of the confrontation with Moore, PB #43, 10 March 1972, in which Cunningham made the main presentation and summary for the PB. Since these are available throughout the organization I will feel free to characterize the position Cunningham presented. He said: "There are two interlocked political points I want to focus on; 1) the democratic centralist nature of this organization and the right of our CC to have a monopoly over the public political lives of all our members, and 2) the Pabloist functioning of Moore in Germany." To me this means Cunningham believed--and I agree--that the central issue

the PB wanted to fight with Moore about was Moore's functioning in Germany, in making a de facto bloc with one wing in a fraternal organization (Bolfra) and determining and carrying out this policy without the instruction of the SL's leading bodies, in fact concealing from the SL that there was a policy being carried out. The central issue was not whether a policy of critical support to one wing (Bolfra) was politically the correct policy, especially since as Cunningham repeatedly insisted we had not been given sufficient information for making such an assessment one way or another. Cunningham also strongly suggests, although not in a categorical way, that the policy of critical support to Bolfra was in fact wrong from our political standpoint.

Contrast this with the position taken in his letter to the PB of 21 May on slate. Cunningham presents what had earlier been the center of the dispute and the basis of extremely sharp criticism of Moore--so sharp that many of us expected that Moore would resign from the organization rather than accept it--as a matter of "bad judgment" and the like.

The central question which was at issue between Moore and the PB is now projected as the debate over the political character of Bolfra rather than Moore's conduct. Cunningham's presentation to the PB had posed our central concern as what Cunningham then characterized as a denial of our democratic centralism and the employment of "Pabloist functioning" by Moore. But the recent letter on slate presents the main point of the dispute with Moore as a difference in the political evaluation of the Bolfra group.

Further, how is it that Cunningham now feels able to assert that Moore was right in his evaluation of Bolfra? In the PB confrontation he defined the crucial issue, from our standpoint, as the question of the SPD, upon which both sides in the German split appeared to have the same position and underlying methodology. Has Cunningham changed his mind about what is the key criterion in determining where Bolfra stands in relation to us politically? Does he assert that since the PB confrontation we have received decisive evidence that Bolfra shares our essential methodological outlook on the SPD? Does he perhaps know something we don't about Bolfra? The change in line on the whole evaluation of the dispute with Moore opens up the basis for a bloc with Moore.

Combinationism

Faced with what might be described, in spectacular understatement, as an unenviable situation, Cunningham has declared himself a tendency.

Late last night Cunningham phoned the National Office and stated that he was in the process of drafting a brief factional statement of a few paragraphs. We urged him to phone it in to the National Office so that it could be circulated as soon as possible. Anticipating that it might not be ready in time to be included in this bulletin, which we were projecting crashing out, we asked him if he would summarize the basic thrust of his position off the top of his head, which he did. It was: The transformation of the SL pro-

jected in the "Transformation Memorandum" was not possible because the program of the SL, while formally correct, is abstracted from reality and from the struggle for implementation, because the leadership does not have the capacity to implement it.

On the basis of this sentence--which Cunningham had not written out in advance and which was not taken down word for word but was pieced together on the basis of notes--we must make certain characterizations.

The key point, which should be immediately obvious, is that this "position" is an evasion--a purely negative definition whose apparent purpose is to serve as a regroupment pole for a rotten bloc of any and all elements opposed to the regime. Not only Moore, who has been vehement in his delineation of an incompetent National Office, but Treiger (the defecting rightist, who moreover questions the validity or viability of post-Trotsky Trotskyism) and the justly despised Turner, unprincipled combinationist par excellence, should be willing to rush forward eagerly to be "hand-raisers" for such a statement.

Perhaps Cunningham hopes this position will appeal to newer comrades eager to struggle for the successful transformation of the SL into a stable vanguard nucleus whose unfamiliarity with the SL might lead them to at least an agnostic position on whether our difficulties stem from objective weaknesses of the organization or from presumed leadership incompetence (or worse). It might appeal to arena parochialists: workerists impatient to pursue union caucus-building faster, RCY campus activists resenting the drain of RCY members into industrial jobs, soft women's liberation work partisans who resent the low priority and small forces allocated to this work, young comrades in any field trying to carry out a line with insufficient guidance, geographically isolated comrades--in short, it might dupe all kinds of soft or isolated elements. But unfortunately for Comrade Cunningham, this is the wrong time to expect the adhesion of many comrades to an opposition whose only program is disgruntlement and dirty hands. This is a period of rapid growth for the SL. It is a period in which we appear to be exercising a powerful force of attraction for several groupings and circles around the country. If our politics appear both correct and important to such circles and individuals, why should they not appear both correct and important to our members themselves? And, not unimportant, re-examination of the "Transformation Memo" in the light of the year's experience since its adoption, in terms of its projections we have done pretty well. We have good grounds, not for complacency, but for pride. We are far from having achieved all the goals projected in the document, much less having transcended them and moved on to a new stage in our development, but on most of the major priorities projected our work indicates that we are moving closer to achieving them.

The main purpose of Cunningham's position is to line up, not primarily critics or doubtists, but known hostiles in a rotten bloc against the party leadership and its program.

If we were taking Cunningham's position at face value, rather than as a cynical maneuver, we would begin by asking: now that you are forming a faction on this basis, just when, Comrade Cunningham, did you raise this position to your presumed PB collaborators, as was your obvious responsibility as even a critic? Did you predict to anyone (other than perhaps to your personal friends) that it would be utopian to expect the existing leadership to carry out its stated intentions? And in the year since the adoption of the perspective, what criticisms of its implementation--let alone criticisms serious enough to justify factionalism--have you stated to your PB colleagues?

Now let us examine the Transformation document itself, necessarily only in broad outline since a discussion in any depth of an attempt to measure our experience in the light of the projection would constitute the core of the document for the forthcoming National Conference--in other words, it's a large subject.

Since a statement of perspective is not just a list of all good things and a statement of determination to struggle harder for them all, but is rather a delineation of priorities in the context of an analysis, it must be kept constantly in mind that an evaluation of how serious or effective we have been thus far in implementing the document depends on what the document itself presented as the dominant and secondary tasks and opportunities.

By far the most urgency and emphasis in the Transformation Memo is devoted to the establishment of a more frequent and regular press, a monthly 8-page tabloid. At the time that the document was conceived (prior to any knowledge of a possible fusion with the CWC) the determination to achieve our immediate press goal was understood to entail a real wrenching operation. At the time we believed that we were going to do it on sheer nerve and we projected it as not only necessary but possible--something which we believed we could accomplish but had not verified. We predicted that should we fail in our intention to achieve a regular 8-page monthly, we could expect serious internal problems as the authority of the leadership would be severely damaged.

An implementation perspective was established in accordance with this overriding goal. The editorial and technical staff of Workers Vanguard have been successfully separated out from other functions of the National Office, later codified in the establishment of an N.O. fraction whose jurisdiction partly overlaps that of the WV editorial board. Other assignments have not been permitted to interfere with WV production.

There have been flaws in the content and in the balance of the paper; there have been delays, including one (and perhaps now two) serious one. We have certainly failed to stabilize an infrequent Spartacist and Marxist Bulletin and pamphlet production have also been disappointing. All the same our basic goal on press has been a success, so much so that we have produced a few 12-page issues despite unavoidable hang-ups in the acquisition of the badly needed new technical equipment.

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In fact the first real threat to the continued regular monthly WV is the current internal struggle which promises to tie up leading comrades and staff members and even before it broke into the open nearly cost us then the membership of Benjamin, WV's managing editor, and Rogers, the circulation manager. By recent report neither has yet made a final decision on whether or not to remain in the SL. Naturally, sharp divisions over principled political issues necessitate factional struggle and its development cannot be dictated, although it can be modulated, by the strongly felt urgency to devote all our attention and forces to the work of building the party.

To conclude on the press question: It is not merely the comrades centrally involved in the production of the paper who deserve the credit. The entire organization does, since virtually every aspect of public work and especially internal functioning has been affected by the absolute top priority assigned to keeping WV coming out every month.

We are in the process of successfully implementing two other tasks deemed crucially important by the Transformation Memo: industrial implantation and the transformation of the RCY into a real youth organization having a real membership and a leadership composed of comrades who, unlike former youth National Chairman Seymour, had not been established leaders in the party before the launching of the RCY.

The SL has recently begun to find considerable success in implanting comrades in industry, quite heavily in proportion to our forces. This is at present rather a wrenching operation itself, as the Boston and Chicago branches have been crippled by key and leading cadres taking jobs in industry and sharply curtailing general external and active internal political activity.

Parenthetically, it is precisely at the moment that we have achieved something of a breakthrough in getting our comrades into auto--after having repeatedly bounced off (without giving up) in trying to give nation-wide scope to the communications fraction and the extension of a deliberately modest fraction in maritime--that our cliquists are beginning this upheaval over the presumed alleged incapacity of the SL under its present leadership to implement the transformation perspective, of which this work is such a crucial part. Here it is relevant to cite Trotsky's affirmation in the appended brief article that elements desiring to base an internal struggle on the regime question instead go out and seek to recruit some young workers. The context is of course crucially different as there were in the 1930's thousands of young workers in motion and Trotsky's advice could be taken quite literally. While we certainly do not project that it is now possible for the SL to recruit large numbers of young workers, we can at least observe that some experience in the struggle to implement our industrial implantation perspective would do our cliquists a world of good. This is an abstract rather than practical suggestion since we see no tendency on the part of these comrades to accept this perspective, but should the discussion experience and decision process re-

veal that some of these people are disciplined we will give them plenty of opportunity to struggle to carry out the transformation which they believe is impossible.

Recently our conceptions on industrial implantation have become more sharply defined. A recent PB discussion considered the question of what proportion of its membership an organization of our qualitative size can put into such work without objectively going over to a liquidation of the ability to carry on public propaganda work and the assorted "housekeeping" activities which are a pre-condition to organizational existence. The PB arrived at the projection that for our present size about one-third in industry is optimum; to reach one-third we still have a way to go and must continue pressing hard on implantation. Moreover within continued numerical growth, the proportion of the membership in industry can and must rise.

Comrade Cunningham is of course free to argue with this conception if he likes as reflecting either a lack of seriousness on the industrialization perspective (too little) or else a workerist deviation (too much) depending on which he thinks would better appeal to his anticipated partners in the rotten bloc.

Of the major tasks emphasized in the document, we have had two which can be characterized as at least qualified failures: the recruitment of a black cadre and the ability to follow through on urgent international opportunities. We withstood considerable skepticism (at least) from Treiger in our determination to seize the opportunity presented by Joe Johnson and his circle in Los Angeles, and the organization as a whole and Comrade Robertson (and Rogers) in particular devoted a considerable expenditure of energy, time and party money to pressing for a resolution one way or another. Unless someone wants to argue that the policy pursued in dealing with Johnson was fundamentally wrong, or that we have passed up or glossed over other opportunities in this field, only a very unconvincing case can be made here--except for those who insist that success is ipso facto the proof of a correct orientation and failure is proof of serious mistakes or a cynical perspective (i.e. sabotage).

Considerable emphasis in the Transformation document is devoted to our international perspectives and our first real chance to break out of enforced national isolation. The ability to implement this perspective is linked in part in the document to the establishment of a group of comrades who can take on this work as a central responsibility. As evidence of our demonstrated seriousness I want to cite in particular the letter to Sharpe and Moore in which Robertson urged Sharpe in particular to make himself available to the organization for an assignment in the center to supervise a team of comrades who would function as a separate department of the N.O., under the direct guidance of the PB. This letter has been followed up by further exhortations. Moore had implied that the non-production of the IDB (an undeniable failure as noted in the document) was evidence of incompetence (or lack of seriousness, or both) with regard to the international situation. On the contrary, I would remind the comrades of the enormous amount of PB time devoted to the international situation--unfortunately, to the insistence, fought out in

the Boston international group meeting and in the confrontations with Moore in the PB, that Moore was not functioning as a disciplined representative of the organization in Germany but was making policy in place of the PB rather than as its ambassador and informant, and that Moore's insistence on the need for the IDB was in fact because he wanted to bring out SL material which would bolster the case of one side, in a factional dispute about which we had been told almost nothing. The internal struggle for a principled and correct line on the world movement and our intervention in it--this too, comrades, was international work.

But perhaps all my examination of the struggle to implement the Transformation Memo will be rendered superfluous overnight by Comrade Cunningham, who may decide to take issue with our perspective as projected there, or with our characterization of the SL as both an unstable and reversible vanguard nucleus and still a propaganda group, or with some aspect of our program. Or perhaps we will be presented with another precipitous resignation, like Treiger's.

But this much should be clear: Cunningham's new-found open oppositional position (or non-position) was precipitated in an instant when he was caught out in a web of lies. He had gambled that he could cover up his secret guilty knowledge of Treiger's maneuverings and his own active pursuance of a cowardly and repellent clique based on years of self-indulgent mutual back-scratching and a hate list of victims and scapegoats. On this desperate hope he lied not only to Robertson--whose veracity in reporting on telephone conversations could always be challenged in a pinch--but to at least one comrade in the Bay Area, stating he had known nothing beforehand of Treiger's manipulation of Benjamin and Rogers and their intention to resign from the SL. That blew sky high when his two associates revealed his duplicity.

Impelled by the logic of cliquism, Cunningham had already undergone a degeneration from secret left-critical and anti-regime cliquism to still underground rotten combinationism. This was shown in his change of position on the dispute with Moore and his reversal on Brosius (formerly a dangerous rightist, now a potential ally because she was not a "hand-raiser"). When the facade of communist morality was finally stripped away entirely by the revelation of his lies, Cunningham could no longer capitulate and return to waiting, watching and intriguing. He was faced with Turner's options (which ironically he himself had so lucidly presented in his contributions to the factional discussion then): to come clean with his comrades, admitting his profound errors, or to seek to construct a smokescreen to camouflage his rush to the door. This is the reason for the new-found and entirely negatively defined "position" on the transformation of the SL.

But it will not end here, comrades. Whatever else he may be, Comrade Cunningham is political. He can hardly expect him to be candid about his real positions as he rushes to solidarize a bloc of cliques on whatever basis seems most likely to win him defenders in his war against the regime which has now committed the final brutal act of documenting his deception and revealing it to the organi-

zation. His fury must be all the more intense because of the extreme bitterness of the leading cadres and those of us who believed ourselves to be his collaborators, for Comrade Cunningham was deeply trusted in this organization.

Nonetheless if political issues, no matter how artificial, are raised, we have a responsibility to deal with them. But I want to insist again that we would not permit ourselves to be deflecting from pursuing the organizational question as well. The issues raised are not mere atrocity stories (which themselves would need to be discussed to demonstrate that we have no need to fear an examination of our conduct). What are at issue are counterposed conceptions on the party question, which along with other central programmatic questions defines the political character of the SL.

The consciousness-destroying clique methods of Cunningham, Moore and Treiger are an insidious threat to the precious cadres accumulated with such great effort. So many comrades in the 1930's had to pass through the clique school of Abern, and some were destroyed by it. But we can make of this struggle a testing and steeling experience so that a cohesive cadre will emerge to carry forward the program of the SL.

The opposition to the regime which has involuntarily surfaced consists essentially of a small portion of our "class of '68," won then on the basis of abstract correctness, but especially over the past year having retreated into little private shells in the face of the enormous demands and changes in the priorities of the SL, systematized in the Transformation Memo. One can make a very good case --which we will test out--that Cunningham balks at the transformation because he and his circle and their similars feel the alien pressures of its implementation; thus, at first mindlessly drifting and now galloping into a fight (or departure) the perspective which they oppose (but don't want to appear to be against) becomes "unrealizable" because of the rotten leadership (of which Comrade Cunningham was until 96 hours ago an integral and leading part). But these sick souls are not the central question. Their corruption (with its accompanying criminal self-wastage) is at the same time an opportunity to fundamentally strengthen the SL. Properly developed, the struggle we undertake will give us an enormous gain in transforming the new layers of the SL into party communists, purging them of New Left, Stalinist-Maoist or workerist residues and all their accompanying organizational excrescence: localist federalism, the circle spirit, cliquism, bureaucratic and maneuverist techniques. We have tripled our forces in the past three years. The present struggle lays the basis for a new leap forward, and upon the solid foundation of a conscious and therefore hardened as well as enlarged cadre.

ON DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM
A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE PARTY REGIME

[Appended to Gordon article]

December 8, 1937

To the Editors of the Socialist Appeal:

During the past months I have received letters in regard to the inner regime of a revolutionary party from several apparently young comrades, unknown to me. Some of these letters complain about the "lack of democracy" in your organization, about the domineering of the "leaders" and the like. Individual comrades ask me to give a "clear and exact formula on democratic centralism" which would preclude false interpretations.

It is not easy to answer these letters. Not one of my correspondents even attempts to demonstrate clearly and concretely with actual examples exactly wherein lies the violation of democracy. On the other hand, insofar as I, a bystander, can judge on the basis of your newspaper and your bulletins, the discussion in your organization is being conducted with full freedom. The bulletins are filled chiefly by representatives of a tiny minority. I have been told that the same holds true of your discussion meetings. The decisions are not yet carried out. Evidently they will be carried through at a freely elected conference. In what then could the violations of democracy have been manifested? This is hard to understand. Sometimes, to judge by the tone of the letters, i.e., in the main instance by the formlessness of the grievances, it seems to me that the complainers are simply dissatisfied with the fact that, in spite of the existing democracy, they prove to be in a tiny minority. Through my own experience I know that this is unpleasant. But wherein is there any violation of democracy?

Neither do I think that I can give such a formula on democratic centralism that "once and for all" would eliminate misunderstandings and false interpretations. A party is an active organism. It develops in the struggle with outside obstacles and inner contradictions. The malignant decomposition of the Second and Third Internationals, under the severe conditions of the imperialist epoch, creates for the Fourth International difficulties unprecedented in history. One cannot overcome them with some sort of magic formula. The regime of a party does not fall readymade from the sky but is formed gradually in the struggle. A political line predominates over the regime. First of all, it is necessary to define strategic problems and tactical methods correctly in order to solve them. The organizational forms should correspond to the strategy and the tactic. Only a correct policy can guarantee a healthy party regime. This, it is understood, does not mean the development of the party does not raise organizational problems as such. But this means that the formula for democratic centralism must inevitably find a different expression in the parties of different countries and in different stages of development of one and the same party.

Democracy and centralism do not at all find themselves in an invariable ratio to one another. All depends on the concrete circumstances, on the political situation in the country, on the strength

of the party and its experience, on the general level of its members, on the authority which the leadership has succeeded in winning. Before a conference when the problem is one of formulating a political line for the next period, democracy triumphs over centralism. When the problem concerns itself with political action, centralism subordinates democracy to itself. Democracy again asserts its rights when the party feels the need to examine critically its own actions. The equilibrium between democracy and centralism establishes itself in the actual struggle, at moments it is violated and then again reestablished. The maturity of each member of the party expresses itself particularly in the fact that he does not demand from the party regime more than it can give. He is a poor revolutionist who defines his attitude to the party by the individual fillips that he gets on the nose. It is necessary, of course, to fight against every individual mistake of the leadership, every injustice and the like. But it is necessary to estimate these "injustices" and "mistakes" not by themselves but in connection with the general development of the party both on a national and international scale. A correct judgment and a feeling for proportion in politics is an extremely important thing. He who has propensities for making a mountain out of a molehill can do much harm to himself and to the party. The misfortune of such people as Oehler, Field, Weisbord and others consists in their lack of feeling for proportion.

At the moment there are not a few half-revolutionists, tired out by defeats, fearing difficulties, aged young men who have more doubts and pretensions than will to struggle. Instead of seriously analyzing political questions in essence, such individuals seek panaceas, on every occasion complain about the "regime," demand wonders from the leadership, or try to muffle their inner scepticism by ultra-left prattling. I fear that revolutionists will not be made out of such elements, unless they take themselves in hand. I do not doubt, on the other hand, that the young generation of workers will be capable of evaluating the programmatic and strategical content of the Fourth International according to merit and will rally to its banner in ever greater numbers. Each real revolutionist who notes down the blunders of the party regime should first of all say to himself: "We must bring into the party a dozen new workers!" The young workers will call the gentlemen-sceptics, grievance-mongers, and pessimists to order. Only along such a road will a strong healthy party regime be established in the sections of the Fourth International.

L. Trotsky

Berkeley, California

29 June 1972

PB

Comrades:

This is intended as written verification of my conversation with Chris and Mark this afternoon.

I am declaring myself formally in opposition to the present leadership of the SL. For this reason I am asking that my name be removed from the slate adopted by the PB last Sunday.

The rapid course of events has precipitated the declaration of a tendency before the development of the necessary documentation. The differences however are sufficient and of such scope and character as to have made the development of this tendency inevitable.

I am preparing a written perspectives document which will be presented to the League during the pre-conference discussion period. On the basis of this platform a counter-posed slate may be presented.

David Cunningham

Preliminary discussions have convinced me that there exists fundamental political agreement between Cunningham and myself on this orientation and on other important political questions.

George Rep

[taken over phone by PB Secretary Cantor at National Office, read back to Cunningham and text verified, 9:50 p.m., 30 June 1972]

From PB Minutes No. 51, 29 June 1972:

ON TREIGER

Motion: We note the politically cowardly and organizationally disgraceful defection of Marvin Treiger from the Spartacist League. We had been promised by him a "statement of resignation" to have been submitted last Sunday. It has not been forthcoming to date. Based on hearsay from those who had been close to him, Treiger's condemnation of the SL (1) centered on the accusation of a sterile and abusive national regime. (2) He is reported to have also (!) questioned the validity or viability of the Trotskyist movement internationally since the death of Trotsky. We note that Geoff White's resignation drew on the same overwhelmingly rampant skepticism although in a rather less offhand fashion (see White exchange appended to PB minutes of 29 July 1968).

Motion: To note the violation of party confidence and the cliquist exploitation by the circuit of Cunningham-Pogers-Schaefer-Treiger of the PB meeting kept secret particularly to protect Treiger's authority in the face of the criticism raised there of his (visible) functioning--while all other comrades involved protected the confidence of that meeting.